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"Today, the First Amendment has become a first line of legal attack."'
I.

INTRODUCTION

The United States Supreme Court, in Turner BroadcastingSystem,
Inc. v. FCC (Turner 11), held that the 1984 Cable Communications Act's
(Cable Act) must-carry provisions were constitutional regulations of the
marketplace.2 In its earlier decision, Turner BroadcastingSystem, Inc. v.
FCC (Turner 1),3 a fractured Court determined that the must-carry provisions were content neutral and subject to an intermediate level of scrutiny
but failed to ultimately determine the constitutionality of the provisionsinstead remanding the case for further factual development.4 When the
case returned, Justice Breyer had replaced Justice Blackmun on the bench.
Nevertheless, the Turner I Court again issued an occasionally caustic and
severely splintered ruling, narrowly holding that laws requiring cable systems to carry local broadcast programming were content neutral. The justices strongly disagreed about the means to determine content neutrality
and about the purpose of the must-carry laws. Despite acknowledging that
Congress expressly designed must-carry to encourage local and educational programming and to ensure diversity of voices in the video market,
a plurality of the Supreme Court said the law's purpose was to structure
the economic marketplace, not to stifle or compel speech.5 Justice
O'Connor's stinging dissent challenged the Court's holding and its rationale, suggesting Justice Breyer's concurrence was actually a dissent and
therefore the panel below should be reversed.' The fractured decision offered little guidance to lower courts seeking a consistent test to determine
the constitutionality of purportedly structural regulations of media.
The Supreme Court earlier rejected another opportunity to establish a
1. Glen 0. Robinson, The New Video Competition: Dances with Regulators, 97
COLUM. L. R.Ev. 1016, 1024 n.27 (1997).
2. Turner Brdcst. Sys., 117 S. Ct. 1174 (1997) [hereinafter Turner II]. Previously, on
direct appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Columbia, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case for factual development of the record. Turner
Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994) [hereinafter Turner 1]. On remand, a threejudge panel granted summary judgment for the government and Commission. 910 F. Supp.
734 (D.D.C. 1995).
3. Turner1,512 U.S. 622.
4. Id.

5. Turner!!, 117 S.Ct. at 1188.
6. Justice O'Connor argued that Justice Breyer had not joined the majority because his
concurrence relied on distinct, and conflicting, reasoning. Id. at 1208 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
7. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Purpose Scrutiny in ConstitutionalAnalysis, 85 CAL. L.
REv. 297 (1997) (scrutinizing the inconsistent analysis of statutory purpose in intermediate
scrutiny).
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constitutional standard of review for structural regulations of telephone
companies. Rather than decide whether the First Amendment prohibits a
federal statutory ban on telephone company provision of video to its subscribers, the Court asked the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals to determine
whether the case was made moot by passage of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996 (Act or 1996 Act), which repealed the challenged provision of
the Cable Act.9 The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled the question
moot and left telephone companies, like cable operators, with little understanding of their constitutional status."0
In the meantime, other courts face an increasing array of constitutional challenges from new First Amendment players grappling with federal regulations that distinguish among and differentially constrain the
business operations and services of communications industries.' Courts
continue to confuse the constitutional protection of communications industries and will undoubtedly cite Turner!!just as they have cited Turner
I as justification both to sustain and to overturn the constitutionality of
media structural regulations.' 2 Thus, this Article maintains that the constitutional question at the heart of the First Amendment challenges to the Cable Act ban on telephone company provision of video is not moot. Rather,
this Article examines the context and content of the Cable Act-telco cases
8. United States v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 116 S. Ct. 1036 (1996) (vacating
and remanding for consideration of mootness).
9. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, sec. 302(b)(1), 110 Stat.
56, 124 (West Supp. 1997) (repealing 47 U.S.C. § 533 (b)).
10. United States v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., Case No. 93-2340 (4th Cir. Apr.
17, 1996) (vacating as moot telephone company constitutional challenge to 47 U.S.C. §
533(b)). Between 1993 and 1996, more than a dozen federal courts ruled 47 U.S.C. §
533(b) unconstitutional.
11. See Robinson, supra note 1, at 1023 (suggesting the Turner rulings will "inspire
First Amendment challenges to all manner of economic restrictions on media."); Fred H.
Cate, Telephone Companies, the First Amendment and Technological Convergence, 45
DEPAUL L. Rv. 1035, 1036 (1996) (arguing that the constitutional question is not moot
because of technological convergence and industry-specific regulation); see also, e.g.,
NCTA OVS Appeal Focuses on Cable System Rights to Launch Service, COMM. DAILY,
Aug. 29, 1996, at 2 (discussing the NCTA constitutional challenge to FCC's open video
system rules).
12. Cf. Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1996)
(applying intermediate scrutiny because "neither the rules nor the statute are predicated on
the ideas expressed in cable programs" and sustaining the constitutionality of public, educational, and governmental (PEG) programming, leased access, and other provisions of the
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385,
106 Stat. 1460 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (1994))); US West,
Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092, 1100 (9th Cir. 1995) (applying intermediate scrutiny
because "Congress does not appear to have enacted § 533(b) based on the content" of video
programming and striking down the telephone-cable television cross-ownership ban), vacated and remandedfor considerationofmootness, 116 S. Ct. 1037 (1996).
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to explore the power of the First Amendment to eliminate structural and
economic regulation of communications carriers. The consistency and
speed with which lower courts affirmed telephone company First Amendment rights; struck down decades-old rules excluding telephone companies
from the local video market; and ignored nearly a century of statutory and
common law excluding common carriers from content control suggests the
fragility of regulation of communications firms premised purely on
changeable market conditions. Indeed, as Frederick Schauer argues, the
First Amendment appears to be a uniquely effective tool in the legal marketplace.' 3
The effectiveness of constitutional assault on the video programming
ban is illustrated by contrasting this approach with previous ineffectual
economic challenges to the structural regulations. Thus, Part II outlines the
long history of fruitless telephone company attempts to eliminate the ban.
In juxtaposition, Part I surveys the rapid and unanimous success of First
Amendment arguments against the ban. Part IV then outlines how the telephone companies refrained themselves as speakers whose opposition to the
ban was constitutional, not economic. This transformation, Part V suggests, coincided with and was abetted by deregulatory initiatives of the
Federal Communications Commission (FCC or Commission) and Congress. In the final Parts of the Article, the Author suggests that the power
of the First Amendment is impressive but far from certain, considering
court rulings may be influenced by powerful players and dominant public
policy positions.

II. STRUGGLING To ELIMINATE THE BAN
The recent use of the First Amendment to challenge the Cable Act
video ban represents the latest strategy in a long-standing battle. Telephone companies had challenged the video programming ban virtually
from its 1970 inception' 4 as an FCC rule adopted out of fear that huge,

13. Schauer's discussion focuses on academics, but its implications for practicing law-

yers and the judiciary are clear. Frederick Schauer, The FirstAmendment as Ideology, 33
WM. & MARY L. REv. 853, 866 (1992); see also Steven Shiffrin, The Politics of the Mass
Media and the Free Speech Principle,69 IND. L.J. 689 (1994) (arguing against a laissezfaire free speech principle because of the ability of conservatives to "use" the First Amendment to eliminate rational regulation); Frank Munger, Sociology of Law for a Postliberal
Society, 27 LOY. L.A. L. RaV. 89 (1993) (noting, in part, that powerful clients in the legal
system can restructure the system to their own ends); Mark Tushnet, ConstitutionalInterpretation,Character,and Experience, 72 B.U. L. REv. 747 (1992) (examining the forces at
play in discretionary decision making by judges faced with constitutional questions).
14. See United States v. Western Elec. Co., 592 F. Supp. 846, 850 n.3 (D.D.C. 1984).
Telephone company waiver requests to the Modified FinalJudgment's line-of-business restrictions began January 26, 1984, with a request from Bell Atlantic to lease equipment
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powerful telephone companies would dominate the then-fledgling cable
industry. 5 The FCC said the rule, known as the cross-ownership ban,
would eliminate both the opportunity and the incentive for telephone companies to discriminate in carriage and other terms of service against inde-

pendent cable video operators in favor of their own video affiliates. 6 In
1984, the Cable Act ban codified the FCC's established rule with virtually

no independent fact finding. 7 The record indicates that neither the FCC

nor Congress viewed the ban from a First Amendment perspective. The
dominant policy intent was to promote competition and increase regulatory

efficacy in a dynamic communications environment."
That was followed by a January 27, 1984, BellSouth motion to offer software programs and
related services; a February 8, 1984, Pacific and Nevada Bell motion to enter into foreign
businesses; a February 15, 1984, NYNEX request to provide office equipment; a February
24, 1984, BellSouth request to provide communications services and equipment to NASA;
and a March 20, 1984, US West request to engage in real estate transactions. Id.
15. Section 214 Certificates for Channel Facils. Furnished to Affiliated Community
Antenna TV Sys., Final Report and Order, 21 F.C.C.2d 307, para. 43, 18 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 1549 [hereinafter Section 214 Final Report and Order], modified by Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 22 F.C.C.2d 746, 18 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1798 (1970).
16. Id. The 1978 Pole Attachments Act codified a portion of the FCC rule and prevented discriminatory pricing for use of telephone poles. Pub. L. No. 95-234, 92 Stat. 35
(1978) (amending the Communications Act of 1934) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §
224(b)(1) (1994)).
17. H.R. REP. No. 98-934, at 55 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4655, 4692
(reiterating the FCC's intent that the ban prevent local monopolies and encourage diverse
ownership).
18. See, e.g., The CommunicationsAct of 1994: Hearingson S. 1822 Before the Senate
Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 103d Cong. (1994) (favoring enactment of a bill to foster development of the nation's telecommunications infrastructure);
Oversightof Cable Television: Hearings on the Oversight of the 1984 Cable Telecommunications Act Before the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transportation,101st Cong. (1989) (examining competition in the video programming industry); H.R. REP. No. 102-628 (1992); S. REP. No. 102-92 (1991), reprinted
in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133 (noting 11 hearings on cable television between 1989 and
1991); H.R. REP. No. 101-682 (1990) (favoring amendment of the Communications Act of
1934 to increase consumer protection and industry competition); see also Cable Competition Act, S. 1068, 101st Cong. (1989); Cable Consumer Protection Act of 1989, S. 905,
101st Cong. (1989); Cable Television Consumer Protection Act of 1990, S. 1880, 101st
Cong. (1990); Cable Television Consumer Protection Act of 1991, S. 12, 102d Cong.
(1991); Communications Competitiveness and Infrastructure Modernization Act of 1991, S.
1200, 102d Cong. (1991) (permitting telephone provision of cable service and video programming); Communications Act of 1994, S. 1822, 103d Cong. (1994) (deregulating telecommunications and increasing competition and investment); Telecommunications Services
Enhancement Act of 1994, S. 2111, 103d Cong. (1994) (deregulating telecommunications
and encouraging development of a national infrastructure); National Telecommunications
and Information Administration Authorization Act of 1994, S. 1883, 103d Cong. (1994)
(allocating funds to promote and develop telecommunications infrastructure); Communications Competitiveness and Infrastructure Modernization Act of 1991, H.R. 2546, 102d
Cong. (1991); Antitrust and Communications Reform Act of 1994, H.R. 3626, 103d Cong.
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Yet the ban withstood years of FCC and congressional scrutiny and
repeated telephone company claims that changed economic and market
conditions eliminated the need for and utility of the ban.19 Market changes
that radically redefined telecommunications were overshadowed by policy
debate between those favoring unfettered competition as the means to efficiently achieve public policy objectives and those arguing that (past and
present) monopolists required heavy government oversight. The regulatory/deregulatory debate masked a similar dialectic tension between free
speech and economic, structural regulation." Telecommunications policy
debate rarely recognized that common carriage might serve a dual function: to reduce transaction costs in the use of infrastructure and to enhance
21
free speech .
(1994) (superseding the Modified Final Judgment and broadly amending the Communications Act of 1934).
19. FCC, OPP STAFF REPORT, FCC POLICY ON CABLE OWNERSHIP 162 (1981); see also,
Comm'n's Rules Concerning Carriage of TV Brdcst. Signals by Cable TV Sys., Report and
Order, 1 FCC Rcd. 864, 61 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 792 (1986), modified by Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 2 FCC Rcd. 3593, 62 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1251 (1987); Telephone
Co.-Cable TV Cross-Ownership Rules, Notice of Inquiry, 2 FCC Rcd. 5092 (1987); Telephone Co.-Cable TV Cross-Ownership Rules, FurtherNotice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 3 FCC Rcd. 5849 (1988); Telephone Co.-Cable TV Cross-Ownership
Rules, Second Report and Order, Recommendation to Congress, and Second FurtherNotice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 FCC Rcd. 5781, 71 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 70 (1992)
[hereinafter Cross-OwnershipSecond Report and Order], modified by Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration and Third FurtherNotice of ProposedRulemaking, 10
FCC Rcd. 244, 76 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 740 (1994); see also, e.g., Competitive Issues in the
Cable Television Industry: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies, and
Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. (1988); Cable Television Regulation: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications and Finance of
the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 101st Cong., pts. 1 & 2 (1990); Cable Instructional Television and S. 1200 Communications Competitiveness and Infrastructure
ModernizationAct of 1991: HearingsBefore the Subcomm. on Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation,102d Cong. (1992); Effects of Telecommunications Mergers: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopolies, and
Business Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. (1993); Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 2, 106
Stat. 1460 (1992) (reforming telecommunications regulation but leaving intact the telephone-cable cross-ownership ban); and proposed telecommunications reform bills: Cable
Competition Act, H.R. 2437, 101st Cong. (1989); Communications Competitiveness and
Infrastructure Modernization Act of 1993, H.R. 1504, 103d Cong., (1993); Communications Competitiveness and InfrastructureModernizationAct of 1991, S. 1200, 102d Cong.
(1991); Cable CompetitionAct, S. 1068, 101st Cong. (1989).
20. Chairman Reed Hundt, Toward Regulation That Fosters Competition, 47 FED.
COMM. L.J. 265 (1994); see also Eli M. Noam, Principlesfor the Communications Act of
2034: The Superstructure ofInfrastructure, 47 FED. COMM. L.J. 317 (1994) (arguing that
competition between common and private carriers distorts the market and is unstable);
ALFRED KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 113-71
(1971).
21. Noam, supra note 20, at 320. But see Amendment of Pt. 74, Subpart K, of the
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Then, in the late 1980s, Robert Pepper pointed out the potential conflict between common carrier regulation and the First Amendment. In an
FCC planning paper, Pepper suggested that established First Amendment

protection of cable systems might logically invalidate regulatory constraint
of telephone company broadband networks if telephone companies pro-

vided cable-like content over their common carrier facilities.23 He also
questioned whether common carrier safeguards would become unconstitutional when a carrier provided content, thus foreclosing telephone companies from entering into content. 24
Without adopting Pepper's First Amendment reasoning, the FCC
formally recommended that Congress eliminate the cross-ownership ban in
the early 1990s. ' In its 1992 Second Report and Order on the Cable Act

cross-ownership ban, the FCC told Congress that elimination, not continuation, of the ban would "promote [the Commission's] overarching
goals.., by increasing competition in the video marketplace, spurring the
investment necessary to deploy an advanced infrastructure, and increasing
the diversity of services made available to the public.",2' Despite growing

policy consensus that regulatory inconsistencies between private and
common carriers distort economic markets and dissuade rapid development of infrastructure, Congress failed to repeal the ban. 27 In response, the
FCC introduced a series of cumbersome and evolving video dialtone rule

makings to permit telephone companies to provide video. 21However, "the
Comm'n's Rules and Regs. Relative to Community Antenna TV Sys., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 39 F.C.C.2d 377, para. 39, 26 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 739 (1973) (noting the
dual role of the telephone-cable cross-ownership rules to foster both "increased competition
in the economic marketplace" and "increased competition in the marketplace of ideas").
22. FCC, OPP WORKING PAPER, THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS: INTEGRATED
BROADBAND NETWORKS, REGULATORY POLICIES, AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (authored by
Robert M. Pepper), 4 FCC Rcd. 1306 (1988).
23. Id. para. 75.
24. Id.
25. Cross-OwnershipSecond Report and Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 5781, para. 3, 71 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 70 (1992), modified by Memorandum Opinion and Orderon Reconsideration and Third FurtherNotice ofProposedRulemaking, 10 FCC Rcd. 244, 76 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 740 (1994).
26. Id. para. 135. For Department of Justice support of the repeal, see Reply Comments
of the U.S. DOJ, to the FurtherNotice of ProposedRulemaking, FirstReport and Order
and Second FurtherNotice ofInquiry in CC Dkt. No. 87-266, at44 (March 13, 1992).
27. See National Communications Competition and Information Infrastructure Act of
1994, H.R. 3636, 103d Cong. (1994) (approving immediate sweeping communications deregulation); H.R. REP. No. 103-560 (1994) (finding that diversity in telecommunications is
best advanced through unfettered market operation). But see S. REP. No. 103-367 (1994)
(urging incremental changes and retention of local and national cross-ownership rules to
protect diversity in the telephone industry).
28. See Reporting Requirements on Video Dialtone Costs and Jurisdictional Separa-
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'
courts [took] the lead in rearranging the telecommunications industry.

29

III. CHANGING THE LINE OF ATTACK
Although the telephone industry had been regulated as a carrier of

others' goods for most of a century, by the mid-1990s, telephone companies had assaulted regulations, which confined them to serve as pure vehicles, with a barrage of lawsuits claiming a First Amendment right to provide content as well." Like the cable companies before them," the
telephone companies chaffed at the restricted role of transporter and
tions for Local Exchange Carriers Offering Video Dialtone Serv., Order Inviting Comments, 60 Fed. Reg. 35,548, modified andadopted by Memorandum Opinion and Order, 10
FCC Rcd. 11,292 (1995); see also Telephone Co.-Cable TV Cross-Ownership Rules, FurtherNotice ofProposedRulemaking, FirstReport and Orderand Second FurtherNotice of
Inquiry, 7 FCC Rcd. 300, 69 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1613 (1991) [hereinafter CrossOwnership First Report and Order], reconsiderationgrantedin part and denied in part by
Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 7 FCC Rcd. 5069, 71 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 66 (1992); Cross-OwnershipSecond Report and Order,7 FCC Rcd. 5781, 71 Rad.
Reg. 2d (P & F) 70.
29. Commissioner Andrew C. Barrett, Shifting Foundations: The Regulation of Telecommunications in an Era of Change, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 39, 53 (1993); see also, Pacific
Telesis Group v. United States, 84 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir.), vacated and remandedfor consideration ofmootness, 116 S. Ct. 1037 (1996); BellSouth Corp. v. United States, 868 F. Supp.
1335 (N.D. Ala. 1994); Ameritech Corp. v. United States, 867 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Il1.
1994); NYNEX Corp. v. United States, Civ. No. 93-323-P-C, 1994 WL 779761 (D. Me.
Dec. 8, 1994); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D.
Va. 1993), aft'd, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994), vacated and remandedfor considerationof
mootness, 116 S. Ct. 1036, vacated as moot, No. 93-2340 (4th Cir. Apr. 17, 1996) (lifting
the ban and permitting the regional Bell companies to offer cable and other information
services). Some speculate that Chesapeake & Potomac was the regional Bell to initiate this
series of parallel lawsuits because it could bring suit in the 4th Circuit "rocket docket,"
known for the speed with which it renders judgments.
30. See Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887), amended in part by
Mann-Elkins Act, ch. 309, § 7, 36 Stat. 539, 544-45 (1910), repealedby Communications
Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1997)). The Mann-Elkins Act subjected telephone and telegraph
service to the regulatory jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
31. Pacific Telesis, 48 F.3d 1106; BellSouth, 868 F. Supp. 1335; Ameritech, 867 F.
Supp. 721; NYNEX, 1994 WL 779761; US West v. United States, 855 F. Supp. 1184 (N.D.
Ill.), affd, 48 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated and remandedfor considerationof mootness, 116 S. Ct. 1037 (1996); Chesapeake & Potomac, 830 F. Supp. 909; see also USTA
Wins Summary Judgment: U.S. Dist. Court Says All Telcos Can Offer Video Programming,
COMM. DAILY, Jan. 30, 1995, at 1; USTA, OPATSCO, NCTA Win Lawsuit to Lift CablePhone Ownership Ban, DAILY REP. FOR ExEcuTivs, Jan. 30, 1995, at A19; Bell Atlantic
Files Brief. Industry Gears up for Supreme Court Argument on Telco ProgrammingBan,
COMM. DAILY, Oct. 20, 1995, at 2.
32. See, e.g., Turner Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 819 F. Supp. 32 (D.C. Cir. 1993), vacated and remanded, 512 U.S. 622 (1994), summary judgment granted, 910 F. Supp. 734
(D.D.C. 1995) (upholding must-carry provisions of 1984 Cable Act), aff'd, 117 S. Ct. 1174
(1997); Century Comm. Corp. v. FCC, 835 F.2d 292 (D.C. Cir. 1987), clarifiedby 837 F.2d
517 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Quincy Cable Tel., Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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moved to embrace a dual function as both content suppliers and carriers."
To effect this shift in status, telephone companies claimed they were being
unconstitutionally deprived of their right to speak by regulations the government claimed merely constrained the economic structure of the communications industry.34
The telephone companies' First Amendment argument arose en
masse virtually overnight. It followed closely upon a variety of market
changes that boded ill for the continued growth of traditional telephone
company services, revenues, and technological developments that enabled
telephone to readily transport video programming." The local telcos were
asking the courts to take action "where Congress had failed or declined to
adapt telecommunications law to changing technological and economic
circumstances. Assertions of First Amendment rights were calculated to

expand the economic market of telephone companies. The telephone companies wanted to speak to their network of customers through lucrative cable video.38

33. See generally Daniel Brenner, Cable Television and the Freedom of Expression,
1988 DUKE L.J. 329 (concluding that the First Amendment does not prohibit exclusive franchising or access requirements imposed on cable).
34. See generally Jonathan W. Emord, The FirstAmendment Invalidity ofFCCOwnership Regulations, 38 CATH.U. L. REv. 401 (1989); Erin M. Reilly, Comment, The TelecommunicationsIndustry in 1993: The Year of the Merger, 2 COMMLAw CONSP. 95 (1994);
Eric T. Werner, Comment, Something's Gotta Give: Antitrust Consequences of Telephone
Companies'Entryinto Cable Television, 43 FED. COMM. L.J. 215 (1991).
35. See, e.g., Pacific Telesis, 48 F.3d 1106; GTE Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 39 F.3d 940 (9th
Cir. 1994); Southern New Eng. Tel. Co. v. United States, 886 F. Supp. 211 (D. Conn.
1995); BellSouth, 868 F. Supp. 1335; Ameritech, 867 F. Supp. 721; NYNEX, 1994 WL
779761; US West, 855 F. Supp. 1184; Chesapeake& Potomac, 830 F. Supp. 909. But see
Bert W. Rein et al., The Constitutionality ofthe FCC'sTelevision-Cable Cross-Ownership
Restrictions, 34 FED. COMM. L.J. 1 (1982) (summarizing an earlier petition for rulemaking
to the FCC on behalf of a television station and asking for elimination of the ban on television and cable cross-ownership as an unconstitutional restriction of television companies'
First Amendment rights).
36. See generally Barrett, supra note 29 (providing an overview of the logic and utility
of current telephone-cable alliances).
37. Ameritech, 867 F. Supp. at 728.
38. The Supreme Court has ruled that video programming is protected speech. See,
e.g., Los Angeles v. Preferred Comm., Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 (1986) (comparing cable
communications with traditional First Amendment speakers: newspapers, books, pamphlets,
and public speakers); Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444 (1991) ("[Cable] is engaged
in 'speech' under the First Amendment .... "); LEONARD LEvY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE
PRESS (1985) (containing a thoroughly documented discussion of the original meaning of
the First Amendment, and the conclusion that the amendment always allowed regulation of
some forms of speech). But see Cross-OwnershipFirstReport and Order, 7 FCC Rcd. 300,
69 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &F) 1613 (1991), reconsiderationgranted in partand deniedin part by
Memorandum Opinion and Orderon Reconsideration, 7 FCC Rcd. 5069, 71 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 66 (1992). Despite FCC disclaimers, the video programming distributed by tele-
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The initial constitutional challenge to the Cable Act's ban on video
programming came when Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Co. of Virginia (C&P Telephone) brought suit in December 1992 against the city of
Alexandria, Virginia. The city had cited the Cable Act's ban as grounds for
its denial of the telephone company's req5uest for a cable franchise to provide a competitive cable video system. C&P Telephone challenged the
41
ban as an unconstitutional denial of its right to free speech.
Both the federal district and the circuit courts ruled that the so-called

cross-ownership ban unconstitutionally restricted C&P Telephone's First
Amendment right to free speech. 41 Both courts subjected the ban to the intermediate scrutiny test articulated in United States v. O'Brien42 and found
the ban failed to overcome O'Brien's requirements that content-neutral
regulations of speech 4" (1) further an important or substantial governmental interest; (2) that the interest be unrelated to the limitation of expression
of views; and (3) that the incidental limitation of free expression be no
greater than is necessary to achieve the governmental interest." Both
courts accepted the government's interest as important and unrelated to the
content of speech, but focused on the third prong, finding that the ban was
unconstitutionally overbroad."
By 1995, a string of federal courts, unanimously applying intermediate scrutiny, found the ban unconstitutionally overbroad. In none of these
cases did the government dispute the telcos' claims that the ban abridged
speech. 47 The government instead defended the ban as essential to promote
phone companies is indistinguishable from, and in some cases identical to, that distributed
by cable operators.
39. Chesapeake & Potomac, 830 F. Supp. at 917.
40. Id. at 911 (citing Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984,47 U.S.C. § 533(b)).
41. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181, 185 (4th Cir. 1994),
vacated and remandedfor consideration of mootness, 116 S. Ct. 1036, vacated as moot,
No. 93-2340 (4th Cir. Apr. 17, 1996); Chesapeake& Potomac, 830 F. Supp. at 932.
42. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
43. Chesapeake & Potomac, 42 F.3d at 202 (4th Cir. 1994); Chesapeake & Potomac,
830 F. Supp. at 917.
44. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
45. Chesapeake & Potomac, 42 F.3d at 202; Chesapeake & Potomac, 830 F. Supp. at
931-32.
46. Pacific Telesis Group v. United States, 84 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir.), vacated and remandedfor considerationof mootness, 116 S. Ct. 1037 (1996); BellSouth Corp. v. United
States, 868 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ala. 1994); Ameritech Corp. v. United States, 867 F. Supp.
721 (N.D. Ill. 1994); NYNEX Corp. v. United States, Civ. No. 93-323-P-C, 1994 WL
779761 (D. Me. Dec. 8, 1994); US West v. United States, 855 F. Supp. 1184 (N.D. Ill.),
affd, 48 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1994), vacatedand remandedfor considerationof mootness,
116 S. Ct. 1037 (1996); Chesapeake &Potomac, 830 F. Supp. 909.
47. See, e.g., Southern New Eng. Tel. Co. v. United States, 886 F. Supp. 211, 214 (D.
Conn. 1995); BellSouth, 868 F. Supp. at 1338 (N.D. Ala. 1994); Ameritech, 867 F. Supp. at
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competitive and diverse local media ownership, and to prevent telephone
company anticompetitive practices. The courts dismissed government efforts to analogize the ban to laws of general application which are subject
to only rational review.
The courts also clearly distinguished the Cable Act-telco cases from
precedents which upheld bans on newspaper and broadcasting crossownership. 49 The courts reiterated that the scarcity principal was the foundation for the Supreme Court's ruling in FCC v. National Citizens Committee for Broadcastingand provided no justification for the telephone and
cable cross-ownership ban.
While the courts found "a substantial governmental and First
Amendment interest in promoting a diversity of views provided through
multiple technology media,"'" they consistently cited Turner 1 52 to hold
that the government's market or antitrust concerns were insufficient to
shield the law from heightened First Amendment scrutiny.53 The courts
also turned to Turner I to justify independent court evaluation of the facts
purportedly supporting the ban.54 The courts refused to defer to congressional judgment about the need for the ban because of vast changes in the
cable television market since the ban's 1984 enactment. In addition, the
congressional record failed to show independent congressional fact finding
about the need for and utility of the ban. In rulings focusing on the third
prong of the O'Brien test, the courts concurred that the government had
failed to prove that the ban advanced its intended goals with no greater
56
burden on speech than necessary.
728; US West, 855 F. Supp. at 1191; Chesapeake & Potomac, 830 F. Supp. at 917-18. But
see GTE Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 39 F.3d 940, 943 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that constitutional
issue was raised untimely and reporting FCC's argument that ban was a legitimate structural
economic regulation).
48. See, e.g., Ameritech, 867 F. Supp. at 730; Chesapeake & Potomac,42 F.3d at 191.
49. FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Brdcst., 436 U.S. 775 (1978) (upholding
newspaper and broadcast cross-ownership ban); see also Marsh Media, Ltd. v. FCC, 798
F.2d 772 (5th Cir. 1986) (rejecting a First Amendment challenge to broadcast and cable
cross-ownership rules).
50. See, e.g., US West, Inc. v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated and remandedfor consideration ofmootness, 116 S. Ct. 1037 (1996); Chesapeake &
Potomac, 42 F.3d at 191.
51. Ameritech, 867 F. Supp. at 726.
52. TurnerI,512 U.S. 622 (1994).
53. See, e.g., Ameritech, 867 F. Supp. at 730 (citing Turner1, 512 U.S. at 640).
54. Id. at 734-35 (asserting the court's duty to independently assess the necessity of the
ban to achieve its stated goals).
55. Id.; see also, Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (holding
that rules that implicate First Amendment freedoms must be supported with factual evidence, not unsupported theory, hypothesis, or speculation).
56. BellSouth Corp. v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ala. 1994).
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The courts consistently sidestepped the thorny issue of reconciliation
of First Amendment freedom with common carrier regulation and judicial
precedent that categorically separates common carriage from content control.57 Only the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 4th Circuit, in affirming the
lower court's C&P Telephone ruling, mentioned the apparent tension between established common carrier principles and the assertion of First
Amendment rights by telephone companies. After concluding that physical
and market characteristics of cable justified regulation and that intermediate scrutiny should be applied to the content-neutral ban,58 the court said:
Although common carriers are not members of "the press" insofar as
47 U.S.C. § 202 precludes them from exercising editorial control over
the communications they transmit, the foregoing would nevertheless
seem applicable to Section 533(b), which restricts a class of speakers
from joining the press by operating, with editorial control and within
certain areas, cable systems.
This nonsensical statement appears to state that although Title II does not
define telephone companies as protected speakers and, indeed, proscribes
their exercise of editorial control over the messages they carry, the Cable
Act ban nevertheless unconstitutionally restricts this "class of speakers"
from exercising certain types of editorial control. The rest of the First
Amendment rulings in favor of telephone companies preferred to avoid
this imbroglio.
Yet at least one district court apparently would subject any regulation
of telephone companies to heightened scrutiny. In dicta, the district court
in Southern New England Telephone Co. v. United States noted that "even
if the statute was directed at non-speech activity... it must be subjected to
heightened scrutiny because it 'impose[s] a disproportionate burden upon
those engaged in protected First Amendment activities.""'6 Seemingly,
then, no regulation of any aspect of the operation of a telephone company
could be justified purely as rational, economic regulation.
Although the Supreme Court chose not to address the question of the
extent of a telephone common carrier's First Amendment rights,6' lower
courts consistently affirmed First Amendment protection of telcos. The
mere mention of the First Amendment by telcos effectively eliminated any

57. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994), vacated and remandedfor considerationofmootness, 116 S. Ct. 1036, vacated as moot, No.
93-2340 (4th Cir. Apr. 17, 1996).
58. Id. at 192-96.
59. Id. at 196.
60. Southern New Eng. Tel., 886 F. Supp. at 217 (D. Conn. 1995) (alteration in original) (quoting Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 704 (1986)).
61. United States v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 116 S. Ct. 1036 (1996).
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discussion by the government of the core premise and goal of common
carriage: to segregate content and carriage. Indeed, the Cable Act-telco de-

cisions render classification as a communications common carrier virtually
meaningless. By eliminating the distinction between speakers and carriers,
the courts opened the spectrum of telephone regulation to constitutional
challenge. In addition, the Cable Act-telco rulings may open the door to
more intrusive carrier-type regulation of any speakers or communications

technologies, subject only to intermediate--not strict-scrutiny. 62

IV. REFRAMING THE PLAYERS AND THE QUESTION

A.

Challengingthe MandatedSilence of Common Carriers
Neither statute nor common law clearly defines common carrier.63

The Communications Act of 1934, which outlines the obligations of communications common carriers, circularly defines a common carrier as
62. See TurnerH, 117 S. Ct. 1174, 1186, in which the Court applied intermediate scrutiny based on the plurality's opinion in Turner1, 512 U.S. 622, 640-41 (1994) (holding that
speaker- or medium-partial regulations are always subject to some degree of heightened
scrutiny). Some justices, led by Justice O'Connor, have alternatively argued that speechrelated regulation of cable must be assessed under strict scrutiny standards. Turner 11, 117
S. Ct. at 1208 (O'Connor, J. dissenting) (arguing that Justice Breyer's view of the mustcarry rules as "speech enhancing" should have subjected the rules to strict scrutiny); Turner
I, 512 U.S. at 675 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Intermediate scrutiny as applied in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968),
has been established as the appropriate standard of review for regulation of cable. Most recently, the Court adopted the O'Brien test in Turner I1 When compared to strict scrutiny,
the intermediate O'Brien test requires that regulation (1) address an "important or substantial," rather than a compelling, government interest; and (2) be narrowly tailored, rather
than the least intrusive, means of achieving that interest. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491
U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (re-articulating the second O'Brien prong to require only that regulation does not "burden substantially more speech than is necessary to further the government's legitimate interests"); see also Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota
Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983) (holding that regulatory distinctions for
media are presumptively invalid unless justified by "some special characteristic"); Central
Hudson Gas and Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 573-579 (1980)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) (warning against the expanded application of the intermediate
standard). Justice Rehnquist dissented, arguing that state-created monopolies enjoy no First
Amendment protection. Id. at 584.
63. The U.S. Code states that a "common carrier" shall be defined by common law.
Statutes, however, mandate that communications common carriers, such as telephone and
telegraph companies, shall provide access to anyone who can pay and shall not alter the
content of the senders' messages. 47 U.S.C. § 201 (1994); see also FCC v. Midwest Video
Corp., 440 U.S. 689, 701 (1979); National Ass'n of Reg. Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 525 F.2d
630, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1976) [hereinafter NARUC 1] (holding that common carriers may not
discriminate between two like customers); National Ass'n of Reg. Util. Comm'rs v. FCC,
533 F.2d 601, 609-610 (D.C. Cir. 1976) [hereinafter NARUC II] (deciding that common
carriers do not control the content they transmit).
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"[a]ny person engaged as a common carrier for hire." The FCC provided

a similarly unenlightening definition when it said a common carrier is "any
person engaged in rendering communication service for hire to the public.,,"65
The common law is no more helpful. In National Association of
Regulatory Utility Commissioners v. FCC (NARUC 1), a case cited by nu-

merous courts struggling with common carrier doctrine, the D.C. Circuit
defined a common carrier firm as a firm "that engages in common carriage."66 The NARUC I court also offered the functional definition that

oneself out indiscriminately to the
common carriage arises from "hold[ing]
,,17
clientele one is suited to serve ....

Thus, subsequent court and FCC de-

cisions focused on whether a firm affirmatively held itself out to offer
nondiscriminatory service to like customers."
In general, courts and regulators agreed that regulated common carriers must provide access to anyone who can pay and may neither disseminate their own messages nor alter the content their customers send. Tele-

phone common carriers must: 1) offer their services to the general public;
2) permit subscribers to control the messages they send; and 3) engage in
interstate commerce. 9 Rather than attempt to define common carriage,
courts and the FCC instead delineated conditions that justified common-

carrier-type regulation. Common law established that control of common
carriers is justified to minimize disruption of public property, to assure the
greatest service to the greatest number of citizens, and to control monopoly
power and prevent abusive business practices." Thus, the 1934 Communi64. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 153(h), 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C.A. § 153(10) (West Supp. 1997)).
65. 47 C.F.R. § 21.1 (1996). Historically, communications common carriers have been
required to (1) offer their services to the general public; (2) permit subscribers to control the
messages they send; and (3) engage in interstate commerce. See generally Midwest Video,
440 U.S. 689; Frontier Brdcst. Co., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 24 F.C.C. 251, 16
Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1005 (1958) [hereinafter FrontierMemorandum Opinion and Order].
66. ROBERT W. POOLE, UNNATURAL MONOPOLIES 43 n.7 (1985) (citing NARUC 1, 525

F.2d at 633).
67. NARUCI, 525 F.2d at 641.
68. See generally Wold Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 735 F.2d 1465, 1471 (D.C. Cir. 1984);
NARUCI, 525 F.2d at 641-42; NARUC I1,533 F.2d 601, 609 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
69. See generally Midwest Video, 440 U.S. 689; FrontierMemorandum Opinion and

Order, 24 F.C.C. 251, 16 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1005 (1958); see also NARUC 1, 525 F.2d at
641; NARUC H, 533 F.2d at 609; Industrial Radiolocation Serv., Report and Order, 5
F.C.C.2d 197, para. 19, 8 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1545 (1966) ("The fundamental concept of
a communications common carrier is that such a carrier makes a public offering to provide,
for hire, facilities by wire or radio whereby all members of the public who choose to employ such facilities may communicate or transmit intelligence of their own design and
choosing....").
70. See Section 214 Final Report and Order, 21 F.C.C.2d 307, 18 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &
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cations Act contains a recurrent theme that communications carriers
should
71 be regulated to serve the public interest, convenience, and necessity.
In light of this quasi-public character, free speech rights to communicate over telephone wires generally were the exclusive province of the individual users of the telephone, 72 and extensive telephone regulation was
upheld as a reasonable means to advance the First Amendment right of
telephone users to have nondiscriminatory near-universal service and interconnection. 73 To protect the citizens' right of free speech, regulation
generally barred both the telephone system operator and the government
from control of telecommunications content.74
Historically, then, telephone and telegraph services were common
carriers75 while broadcasting was not.76 This distinction resulted from the
F) 1549, modified by Memorandum Opinion and Order, 22 F.C.C.2d 746, 18 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 1798 (1970); see generally 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-27 (1994); American Trucking Ass'n
v. United States, 101 F. Supp. 710 (N.D. Ala. 1951) (upholding regulations of industry--as
a common carrier-against constitutional challenge); see also NARUC I, 525 F.2d at 640641 (discussing the historically "public character" of common carriers). For communications common carriers the concept of operation in the public interest, convenience, and necessity dominated regulation. See Section 214 Authorization, Report and Order, 98
F.C.C.2d 354, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 543 (1984).
71. Telecommunications Act of 1996, sec. 104, § 151, 47 U.S.C.A. 151 (West Supp.
1997); Id. §§ 214, 310(d); see also Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1876) (sustaining legislative policy on rates for grain elevators and introducing the leitmotif of the "public inter-

est').
72. Limited but notable exceptions to the autonomy of telephone callers include obscenity and harassment.
73. See, e.g., Jerome A. Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right,
80 HARV. L. REv. 1641 (1967) (asserting that the First Amendment legitimately advances
the free speech rights of the individual citizen against the power of media owners); Lee C.
Bollinger, Jr., Freedom of the Press and PublicAccess: Toward a Theory ofPartialRegulation of the Mass Media, 75 MICH.L. REV.1 (1976).
74. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TowARD COMPETITION IN LOCAL
TELEPHONY 18-20 (1994) (examining the economic and competitive disadvantages of current common carrier regulations).
75. 47 U.S.C.A. §§ 201-29 (outlining the services and charges of wire or radio communications common carriers such as telegraph and telephone); see also Mann-Elkins Act,
ch. 309, § 7, 36 Stat. 539, 544-45 (1910), repealed by Communications Act of 1934, ch.
652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.A. (West Supp.
1997)); Parks v. Alta Cal. Tel. Co., 13 Cal. 422, 424-25 (Super. Ct. Cal. 1859). Conventional wisdom holds that telephone companies held themselves out as common carriers in a
quid pro quo for protected monopoly status. But see Roland S. Homet, Jr., "Getting the
Message": Statutory Approaches to ElectronicInformation Delivery and the Duty of Carriage,37 FED. COMM. L.J. 217 (1985) (arguing against this oft-repeated position and maintaining that telephone companies functioned as common carriers prior to monopoly status
because of the logical linkage to other vital carriers of business materials, that is, trains and
telegraph).
Much common carrier regulation is designed to offset market imperfections. Coin-
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unique market conditions of the two nascent industries, not from any explicit functional distinction between the two communications services.
This experience-based categorization failed to provide explicit definitional
criteria to help determine the carrier status of emerging technologies, such
as cable." The resulting categorical confusion was exacerbated by rapidly
changing technologies and markets in the 1980s.
In response, the FCC attemgted to tie common carrier regulation to
actual or historical market power. This approach allowed the FCC to ease
regulation of select telephone providers but did little to justify the First
Amendment distinction between common carriers and speakers."
The absence of a clear meaning for the term "common carrier" offered courts hearing the Cable Act-telco cases an opportunity to clarify the
nexus between speakers and carriers. Instead, the courts avoided the terrain

of common carrier definition, ignored a basis to rule that telephone companies might not exert editorial control over their own communicative
channels, and muddied established First Amendment jurisprudence.

mon carriers, such as railroads and telegraphs, historically were viewed as natural monopolies because the high cost of installation and the limited customer base made it economically impossible for competitors to enter the market. Although competition now exists in
long-distance telephone service, Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) continue to
exert market power over local telephone service within their operating areas. See ITHIEL DE
SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 95-98 (1983).
76. Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 153(h), 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as
amended at 47 U.S.C.A. § 153(10) (West Supp. 1997)); Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367 (1969).
77. See, e.g., TurnerI,512 U.S. 622 (1994); NARUC1, 525 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
78. See, e.g., Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier
Servs. and Facils. Authorizations, Notice ofInquiry and ProposedRulemaking, 77 F.C.C.2d
308, paras. 100-01 (1979) [hereinafter Competitive Common CarrierNotice of Inquiry];
FCC MAJOR MATTERS REPORT 40 (1982); see also Cox Cable Comm. Inc., Memorandum
Opinion, DeclaratoryRuling, and Order, 102 F.C.C.2d 110, para. 27, 58 Rad. Reg. 2d (P &
F) 1235 (1985) (applying the market power analysis to determine carrier status); International Competitive Carrier Policies, Report and Order, 102 F.C.C.2d 812, paras. 39-67, 59
Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 283 (1985) (using a market power definitional strategy similar to Cox
Cable Comm.).
79. Phil Nichols, Note, Redefining "Common Carrier": The FCC's Attempt at Deregulation by Redefinition, 1987 DUKE L.J. 501; see also General Tel. Co. v. United States,
449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971) (reasoning that although CATV systems were neither broadcasters nor common carriers, the common carrier status of telephone companies involved in
CATV service was determinative); General Tel. Co. v. FCC, 413 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
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B.

BlurringFirstAmendment Categories
Historically, the courts, Congress, and the FCC applied the First
Amendment's prohibition against restraint of free speech to each communications medium either through analogy to or distinction from established media." A trifurcated system of First Amendment jurisprudence developed" wherein telephony was virtually devoid of First Amendment
protection, print media was sacrosanct,183 and broadcast and a broadening
array of newer electronic technologies were somewhat free from regulation.4

80. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law... abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press .... ."). While interesting, the ultimate resolution of the debate over

constitutional intent is less important to this Article than is the day-to-day interpretation and
application of that document to telecommunications. For relevant discussions of the philosophical underpinnings of free press in America see, for example, ELLIOT D. COHEN,
PHILOSOPIUCAL ISSUES IN JOURNALISM (1992); LEVY, supra note 38; J. HERBERT ALTSCHULL, FROM MILTON TO MCLUHAN: THE IDEAS BEHIND AMERICAN JOURNALISM (1990).

81. For a discussion of how this premise has been called into question, see, for example, DE SOLA POOL, supra note 75. Also, for a general discussion of the objectives of FCC
licensing, see DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG ET AL., REGULATION OF THE ELECTRONIC MASS MEDIA:
LAW AND POLICY FOR RADIO, TELEVISION, CABLE AND THE NEW VIDEO TECHNOLOGIES
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(2d ed. 1991).
82. See, e.g., Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Southeastern Promotions Ltd. v.
Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975) ("Each medium of expression, of course, must be assessed for First Amendment purposes by standards suited to it .... ") (citing Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1957)); United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673
F. Supp. 525, 586 n.273 (D.D.C. 1987) ("[C]ommon carriers are quite properly treated differently for First Amendment purposes than traditional news media." (citing FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979); Columbia Brdcst. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973))). But cf. Daniel Brenner, Telephone Company Entry Into
Video Services: A FirstAmendment Analysis, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 97, 111 (1991)
(stating that the "blurring of the lines between content and conduit reflects the reality of
much of the nation's communications infrastructure"); Angela J. Campbell, Publish or Carriage: Approaches to Analyzing the FirstAmendment Rights of Telephone Companies, 70
N.C. L. REv. 1071 (1992) (arguing that traditional First Amendment analysis of telcos is illsuited to the dispute involving their attempts to provide video services).
83. See Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974) (ruling it unconstitutional to require newspapers to provide a right of reply). But see Competitive Common CarrierNotice ofInquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 308 (1979); Section 214 Final Report and Order, 21 F.C.C.2d 307, 18 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1549, modified by Memorandum Opinion
and Order,22 F.C.C.2d 746, 18 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1798 (1970); Nichols, supranote 79.
84. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 82 (discussing the trifurcated regulatory system that
distinguishes among newspapers, broadcast, and cable); Barron, supra note 73 (asserting
that regulation is necessary to assure public access to monopolistic media).
Also note that certain types of speech (e.g. obscenity and libel) present separate
regulatory rationales, and their regulation may not pose constitutional questions. See, e.g.,
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1973) (holding that a legitimate government interest exists sufficient to prohibit dissemination of obscene material); cf. Tornillo, 418 U.S.
241 (holding that government-mandated access to newspaper columns violated the First
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Telephone services fell outside the ambit of First Amendment jurisprudence because the telephone was treated as an essential utility, not a
speaker.85 For print, the underlying theory was that all had access to the
press, and government intervention was unnecessary to effect an openmarket exchange of ideas." However, when speech was delivered by radio
or television via the scarce and public electromagnetic spectrum, regulation which limited the owner's editorial freedom was constitutionally permissible to assure the First Amendment rights of the audience."
Courts extended the broadcast regulatory model in varying degrees to
other electronic media. 8 From the outset, cable was an enigma. It was a

functional equivalent of television but did not rely upon the scarce spectrum. 89 Courts feared the market power of cable but likened its programming to newspaper content, a form of speech strictly protected by the First
Amendment.
The confusion escalated with the advent of video telephony in the
1990s. Regulatory distinctions became increasingly suspect as private and
common carriers became virtually indistinguishable. 9' Differential regulation of telephone companies and cable operators seemed increasingly inequitable and conflict-ridden. 2 Video delivered over telephone lines converged the three branches of First Amendment jurisprudence and presented
a new issue to the courts.
C.

Raisinga New Question

Although the FCC had spent years attempting to balance First
Amendment and common carrier doctrines, references to FCC debate, or
even more generally to common carrier principles, were notably absent

Amendment); Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969) (affirming a government
right to regulate access to scarce, licensed air waves); see also WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE,
INTERPRETATIONS OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1984) (presenting a graphic interpretation of
the meaning of the First Amendment).
85. DE SOLA POOL, supra note 75.
86. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241.
87. RedLion, 395 U.S. 367.
88. Turner1,512 U.S. 622 (1994).
89. Argued before the Supreme Court in January 1994, Turner I focused in part on the
appropriateness of "pigeonholing any communications industry in[to] a First Amendment
pecking order." Tony Mauro, Cable Industry Case Expected to be a Landmark, THE
RECORDER, Jan. 10, 1994 at 5; see also Linda Greenhouse, New Law Regulating Cable TV
Gets Skeptical Responsefrom High Court,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 1994 at Al2.
90. Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389; see also Turner1, 512 U.S. at 637.
91. NARUCI, 525 F.2d 630, 642 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
92. See BAUMOL & SIDAK, supra note 74 (examining the economic and competitive
disadvantages of current common carrier regulations).
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companies' First
from federal court decisions•• affirming telephone
93
Amendment right to provide video telephony. This omission severed a
critical thread of policy because, prior to the mid-1990s, almost no common law precedent existed to support the assertion of editorial control by a
common carrier. Indeed, prior to the 1993 ruling of the U.S. District Court

in C & P Telephone, few courts had ever been asked to consider the extent
of First Amendment protection enjoyed by a traditional common carrier
when it also functioned in part as a private speaker.94

A handful of cases and FCC rulings suggests that a First Amendment
speaker may function in part as a common carrier. 95 However, neither the
courts nor the FCC had explored the implications of the reverse: allowing
a regulated common carrier to assert autonomous First Amendment control
over a portion of its capacity. 9'

93. Competitive Common CarrierNotice of Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d 308 (1979); FirstReport and Order, 85 F.C.C.2d 1, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 215 (1980); FurtherNotice of
ProposedRulemaking, 84 F.C.C.2d 445 (1981); Second FurtherNotice ofProposedRulemaking, 47 Fed. Reg. 17,308; Second Report and Order, 91 F.C.C.2d 59, 52 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 187 (1982); Order on Reconsideration, 93 F.C.C.2d 54, 53 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F)
735 (1983); Third Report and Order,48 Fed. Reg. 46,791 (1983); Fourth Report and Order, 95 F.C.C.2d 554, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1219 (1983), vacated and remanded sub
nom. American Tel. and Tel. v. FCC, 978 F.2d 727 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Fifth Report and Order, 98 F.C.C.2d 1191, 56 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1204 (1984); Sixth Report and Order, 99
F.C.C.2d 1020, 57 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1391, vacated and remandedsub nom. MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, 765 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1985). As used herein, video telephony is a
broad term that subsumes video dialtone common carrier systems and video systems operated by telephone companies that offer both programming and delivery.
94. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va.
1993), aff'd, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994), vacated and remandedfor consideration of
mootness, 116 S. Ct. 1036, vacated as moot, No. 93-2340 (4th Cir. Apr. 17, 1996) (lifting
the ban and permitting the regional Bell companies to offer cable and other information
services); see also Northwestern Ind. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 872 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(declining to address an issue raised on appeal by telephone companies to have the crossownership ban declared unconstitutional); BellSouth Corp. v. United States, 868 F. Supp.
1335 (N.D. Ala. 1994).
95. See, e.g., An Inquiry Relative to the Future Use of the Frequency Band 806-960
Mhz, Second Report and Order,46 F.C.C.2d 752, paras. 34-35, 30 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 75
(1974), Memorandum Opinion and Order,51 F.C.C.2d 938, paras. 39-44 (1975); Community Antenna TV Sys., FirstReport and Order,20 F.C.C.2d 201, para. 16, 17 Rad. Reg. 2d
(P & F) 1570 (1969) (holding that designation as a speaker and as a common carrier are not
mutually exclusive); see also United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 172
(1968) (citing respondent's argument that cable partakes of "characteristics both of broadcasting and of common carriers but with all of the characteristics of neither .... "); Frontier
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 24 F.C.C. 251, para. 8, 16 Rad. Reg. (P & F) 1005
(1958) (holding that one-way cable services are not engaged in common carriage because
the content is not under the control of the subscriber). But see NARUCII, 533 F.2d 601, 610
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (holding that two-way cable systems are common carriers if customers
have explicit or implicit discretion over content).
96. See, e.g., Telephone Co.-Cable TV Cross-Ownership Rules, FourthFurtherNotice
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In general, courts attempted to avoid ruling on the constitutionality of
structural regulations imposed on communications industries and to rest

holdings upon statutory grounds whenever possible. 7 However, in 1977
the D.C. Circuit Court in National Citizens Committee for Broadcastingv.
FCC (NCCB)9 upheld diversity as a sufficient justification for the newspaper and broadcast cross-ownership ban. In NCCB, the D.C. Circuit said
regulation of the scarce broadcast spectrum was justified and did not violate the newspaper's First Amendment rights because it "neither mandates

nor prohibits what may be published" and is "an attempt to enhance the diversity of information heard by the public .... ,99 The court called a constitutional challenge to the rule "ironic,"'"' ° and, in dicta that may prove
prescient, warned that regulated separation of media protected the full

editorial autonomy of newspapers:
[I]t may be that newspapers can not truly be free of government interference so long as they operate government licensed broadcast stations. An unsavory fact of life is that government has the power to
regulate expression by a "raised eyebrow" reminding the broadcaster

of the triennial government
process. A newspaper opens101 itself
. ... . . renewal
.
..
up to similar intimidation by affiliation with a broadcast station.
This language suggests that at least one judge believed the extension of
First Amendment protection to regulated communications firms could
erode the unequivocal nature of freedom of speech.

For most of the 1980s, the D.C. Circuit Court, the venue of many
telephone company suits, suggested that it legally was "constrained to turn
a deaf ear to these [First Amendment] complaints."'' 2 In a rather typical
response to a 1987 First Amendment challenge to restrictions of the Modi-

ofProposedRulemaking, 10 FCC Rcd. 4617, 78 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1429 (1995).
97. See, e.g., Northwester Ind. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 824 F.2d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1987);
United States v. Western Elec. Co., 774 F. Supp. 11, 12 n.2 (D.D.C. 1991) (noting that the
First Amendment "argument adds nothing to the Regional Companies' claim of injury");
United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 585-86 & n.273 (D.D.C. 1987), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1990); see also General Tel. Co. v. United
States, 449 F.2d 846 (5th Cir. 1971) (affirming, against a due process challenge, FCC requirements that banned telephone companies from providing community antenna television
services unless they first offered independent CATV operators access to carriers' telephone
poles).
98. National Citizens Comm. for Brdcst., 555 F.2d 938 (D.C. Cir. 1977), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part,436 U.S. 775 (1978).

99. Id. at 954-55. While apt in many respects, this case is distinguishable at least on the
ground that broadcast precedents apply uniquely to that medium characterized by spectrum
scarcity. See TurnerI, 512 U.S. 622, 638-39 (1994).
100. National Citizens Comm. for Brdcst., 555 F.2d at 954.

101. Id.
102. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 846 F.2d 1422, 1431 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
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fled FinalJudgment,0 3 District Court Judge Harold Greene said the challenge was without merit: "These [telephone] companies, which have never
been publishers, thus cannot bootstrap their own failure to make the
showing necessary for the relief of their obligations under an antitrust decree into an infringement of their First Amendment rights."'"'
The district court cited FCCv. Midwest Video Corp."'5 and Columbia
BroadcastingSystem, Inc. v. Democratic National Committee (CBS) 1 6 as
establishing the principle that "common carriers are quite properly treated
differently for First Amendment purposes than traditional news media."' 0 7
Both precedents, however, are readily distinguishable from telephone
company constitutional challenges. In Midwest Video, the Supreme Court
held that the FCC could not impose common-carrier-type access requirements on cable operators who enjoyed "journalistic freedom."'0 8 Similarly,
in CBS, the Court affirmed that broadcasters enjoyed editorial autonomy
and, consequently, could not be required to carry paid editorial announcements.' 9 The cases cited by Judge Greene to establish that speech protection shall not be afforded to common carriers instead represent the opposite principle that common carrier regulation shall not be imposed on
speakers.
A question more analogous to telephone company First Amendment
challenges to the Cable Act ban was presented in CentralHudson Gas &
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission.' 0 The question before the
CentralHudson court was whether a state-created monopoly, which is the
subject of a comprehensive regulatory scheme, is entitled to protection under the First Amendment. The Supreme Court answered yes and ruled that
the utility had a constitutional right to promote its services through advertising."' But the lone dissent of Justice William Rehnquist urged that those
constitutional rights be narrowly defined. Justice Rehnquist argued that
"[w]hen the source of the speech is a state-created monopoly such as this,
traditional First Amendment concerns, if they come into play at all, certainly do not justify the broad interventionist role adopted by the Court to-

103.
104.
105.
106.

United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (1982).
United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 586 n.273 (D.D.C. 1987).
Midwest Video, 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
Columbia Brdcst. Sys., 412 U.S. 94 (1973).

107. Western Elec., 673 F. Supp. at 586 n.273.
108. Midwest Video, 440 U.S. at 707.
109. ColumbiaBrdcst. Sys., 412 U.S. 94.
110. CentralHudson, 447 U.S. 557 (1980) (ruling eight to one that a ban on promotional advertising by the state's electrical utility company did not pass intermediate scrutiny
and was unconstitutionally overbroad). But see id. at 583 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).

111. Id. at 567-68.
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day. ' '1 In arguing against application of the First Amendment to the utility
company, Justice Rehnquist warned that the Court's ruling "could invite
dilution, simply by a leveling process, of the force of the Amendment's

guarantee .... 113
Beginning in August 1993, a string of federal courts ignored that
warning.14 Observers echoed Justice Rehnquist and expressed fear that the
extension of First Amendment protection to telephone companies would
adversely affect all First Amendment speakers. Mark Director and Michael Botein said the rulings might have "possible cataclysmic effects on
the entire market.""' 6 Others said the rulings "frayed [the] fibers of social

policy, economic reality, and constitutional constraint .... Asserting
that trifurcated First Amendment jurisprudence lay in tatters, scholars

urged reliance upon laws of general application, such as antitrust, to gird
the ongoing transformation of the media."'
V. CAPITALIZING ON AN OPPORTUNITY
Antitrust rulings in telecommunications, however, also were under

assault during the 1990s. Arguing that market conditions had changed
vastly, the RBOCs continued to attack and wear down constraints imposed
on them by the Modified FinalJudgment that broke up AT&T in 1982."9
For example, early in 1995 Judge Harold H. Greene of the federal dis112. Id. at 585 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 589 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
114. See generally Pacific Telesis Group v. United States, 84 F.3d 1153 (9th Cir.), vacated and remanded for consideration of mootness, 116 S. Ct. 1037 (1996); BellSouth
Corp. v. United States, 868 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D. Ala. 1994); Ameritech Corp. v. United
States, 867 F. Supp. 721 (N.D. Ill. 1994); NYNEX Corp. v. United States, Civ. No. 93-323P-C, 1994 WL 779761 (D. Me. Dec. 8, 1994); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. United
States, 830 F. Supp. 909 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff'd, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994), vacated and
remandedfor consideration of mootness, 116 S.Ct. 1036, vacated as moot, No. 93-2340
(4th Cir. Apr. 17, 1996) (lifting the ban and permitting the RBOCs to offer cable and other
information services); see also Bell Atlantic Files Brief,supra note 31 (quoting the Bell
Atlantic brief which states that "every one of the 16 federal judges who has considered the
question has concluded that the [video program ban] is invalid under the First Amendment'
(alteration in original)).
115. MICHAEL K. KELLOGG ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 719 (1992).
116. Mark D. Director & Michael Botein, Consolidation, Coordination, Competition,
and Coherence: In Search of a ForwardLooking CommunicationsPolicy, 39 FED. COMM.
L.J. 229, 235 (1994).
117. Id. at229.
118. See, e.g., William E.Lee, The First Amendment, Economic Power, and Judicial
Review, Presented Before the 23d Annual Telecommunications Policy Research Conference (Sept. 30-Oct. 2, 1995).
119. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525 (D.D.C. 1987).
120. Judge Greene was charged with oversight of the rules governing the post-
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trict court in Washington, D.C., permitted one RBOC to provide longdistance video programming. 12 Telephone companies had argued that the
economies of scale in a national broadband network were critical to the
economic viability of telephone video efforts.'9 Some observers expected
similar court rulings to allow all local Bell companies to establish nationwide video networks, but it was Congress's passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, not court action, that effectively extended Judge
Greene's ruling to all telephone companies nationwide.'
Prior to the 1996 Act, amid nascent competition between telephone
and cable operators, the FCC initiated inquiries to determine how best to
regulate video telephony in order to minimize regulatory disparities between telephone and cable and to enhance opportunities for new services. 24 In 1995, the FCC began to expand its video dialtone rules to permit
telephone entry into video programming as well as delivery.'
During that same period, congressional debate over the Telecommunications Act expressed an intent to broadly deregulate electronic communications firms to ensure the economic benefits of competition. Aside from
the requisite number of references to diversity of voices, congressional debate did not reflect a desire to deregulate as a means to enable telephone
companies to advance First Amendment interests in public discourse."'
Policy makers instead argued that telephone competition would counteract
the market power of cable monopolies and speed deployment of a national broadband telecommunications network.12

divestiture Bell companies.
121. Mark Landler, Phone Companies Clear TVHurdle, N.Y. TIMfES, March 18, 1995, at
Al.
122. Id.
123. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.A. (West Supp. 1997)).
124. Telephone Co.-Cable TV Cross-Ownership Rules, Fourth FurtherNotice of ProposedRulemaking, 10 FCC Rcd. 4617, 78 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1429 (1995).
125. Id.; For an example of early scrutiny of the cross-ownership ban, see Telephone
Co.-Cable TV Cross-Ownership Rules, FurtherNotice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 3 FCC Rcd. 5849 (1988) (holding that greater participation of telephone companies in providing cable services pursuant to appropriate safeguards created greater competition in cable television service, and therefore, in greater public interest benefits to consumers).

126. See, e.g., Telephone Co.-Cable TV Cross-Ownership Rules, Fourth FurtherNotice
ofProposedRulemaking,10 FCC Rcd. 4617, 78 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 1429.
127. TurnerI, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
128. Clinton Administration Information Infrastructure Task Force, The NationalInformation Infrastructure:Agenda for Action (visited Oct. 2, 1997)
<http://sunsite.unc.edu/nii/NII-Agenda-for-Action.htil>.
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VI. ANALYSIS
In the 1990s, the FCC, the courts, and Congress reconceptualized telephony's regulatory status. An array of decisions transformed telephone
providers from passive, nondiscriminatory conduits to active speaker conduits but failed to determine how to reconcile telephone common carrier
obligations with newly established First Amendment freedoms or to distinguish between expressive and nonexpressive activities.' Yet it is selfevident, as Jerome Barron has noted in another context, that "not all
[cable] activities are First Amendment fungible. Some [cable] activity has
characteristics that should invoke First Amendment protection, but much
does not."'30 The failure of policy makers to draw this difficult line may
have opened regulation of all telephone activities to First Amendment attack.
Yet technological innovations during the 1990s blurred any historical
bright line between media and telephony, or speech and economic activity.' Although First Amendment jurisprudence long had distinguished
among speakers and applied different regulation to each according to its
unique characteristics, such distinctions became increasingly impractical
as technological convergence erased any "special characteristic"' that
distinguished one medium from another. Indeed, economic or technological distinctions between video telephony and cable systems seemed arbitrary, speculative, or capricious.
Yet regulatory barriers to telephone entry into video delivery and
programming dissolved not because of a showing either that the market
had changed, or that regulations no longer advanced a legitimate government economic objective, but because the courts displayed what Jerome
Barron has called "modish deference to even the faintest mention of the
First Amendment.' 34 Lower courts consistently upheld telco First
Amendment rights while ignoring common carrier precedent and govern-

129. Brenner, supra note 33.
130. Jerome A. Barron, On Understandingthe FirstAmendment Status of Cable: Some
Obstacles in the Way, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1495, 1504 (1989).
131. Section 214 Certificates for Channel Facils. Furnished to Affiliated Community
Antenna TV Sys., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 22 F.C.C.2d 746, 18 Rad. Reg. 2d (P
& F) 1798 (1970) (holding that no telephone common carrier subject to the Communications Act could supply CATV service to the viewing public in its area unless a waiver of the
rules had been granted under specified conditions).
132. See, e.g., Campbell, supra note 82 (detailing the theory and application of trifurcated First Amendment jurisprudence).
133. Minneapolis Star & Tribune v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585
(1983).
134. Barron, supra note 130, at 1504.
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ment concerns about market power.'35 The FCC simply followed the
courts' lead, and Congress codified the status quo.
VI. DISCUSSION
The Cable Act-telco cases embody a dramatic change in telephone
company strategy, but the success of these deregulatory efforts lies in the
well-documented power of the First Amendment. In recent years, prominent First Amendment scholars have decried the power of the First
Amendment to stultify debate and truncate analysis in a variety of policy
136
arenas. Criticized as narrow, simplistic, and empty, First Amendment jurisprudence has been contrasted to "the kind of careful analysis of costs
and benefits that is practiced in virtually every other policy field in government."'137 Indeed, scholars argue that rather than facilitate wide-open
deliberations, "the First Amendment in legal and policy analysis has
been.., an analytical stopper, a chiller of discourse."
The Cable Act-telco cases bear this out. The mere mention of the
First Amendment foreclosed detailed exploration of the goals and effects
of the Cable Act ban, or of the intents and efficacy of common carrier constraints, or of the distinction between speech and economic activities.
In the hands of the telephone companies, the First Amendment became a litigatory weapon to eliminate unwanted regulation and to redefine
the battlefield of communications regulation/deregulation. Here, both the
occasions for litigation and the terms of engagement reflected existing
distributions of power and resources, and helped those already advantaged
in other aspects of their business. 139 As "repeat players" in the litigation
game, telephone companies also sought the positive externalities that
would accrue from developing reputations as powerful adversaries.'4
The questions thus raised are political. Telephone companies seek
telecommunications deregulation not primarily, or even necessarily, to re135. See, e.g., Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Minneapolis Star & Tribune, 460 U.S. 575; Red Lion Brdcst. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
136. See Schauer, supra note 13; Robert M. Entman, Putting the FirstAmendment in Its
Place:EnhancingAmerican Democracy Through the Press, 1993 U. CmI. LEGAL F. 61, 72;
Frederick Schauer, The PoliticalIncidence of the Free Speech Principle, 64 U. COLO. L.
REV. 935, 951 (1993); Shiffrin, supra note 13, at 713; Sandra Braman, Information and Socioeconomic Class in U.S. ConstitutionalLaw, 39:3 J. COMM. 163 (1989).
137. Entman, supra note 136, at 72.
138. Id. at 80.
139. See, e.g., Shiffrin, supra note 13, at 713; Braman, supra note 136; Schauer, The
PoliticalIncidence ofthe Free Speech Principle,supra note 136, at 950-51, 957.
140. See Robert H. Gertner, Asymmetric Information, Uncertainty,and Selection Bias in
Litigation, 1993 U. CI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 75, 80 (exploring the nonrandomization of
cases filed, settled, and litigated).

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 50

duce government intrusion into the communications market. Rather, deregulation is desirable because it changes the mix of government influences,14 1 and shifts the locus of power toward those with power, resources,
and advantage. 142 The courts resolving the questions are both an instrument
and an embodiment of the existing social, economic, and political environment.143
In that context, the courts logically chose to construe the issue before
them narrowly. Direct consideration of the constitutional question--that is,
which telephone company activities truly are imbued with First Amendment rights-was not politically expedient and was not necessary to resolution of the cases at hand. Again and again, the federal courts demonstrated a willingness to view the First Amendment as a trump that obviated
the need for fundamental doctrinal analysis.
By relying on the First Amendment trump, the courts failed to provide guidance on how to distinguish between economic and expressive activities, or to suggest mechanisms to replace the historical carrier/speaker
dichotomy that would permit more logical determinations of the rights and
responsibilities of various members of the electronic press. The courts
failed to offer a useful definition for common carriers that would help
clarify which communications entities qualify and under what conditions,
or to determine whether common carrier status is a self-imposed condition
or a regulatory mandate. The courts failed to determine what evidence is
necessary to justify regulatory distinctions, or to establish the degree of
deference that should be given to historical or contemporary administrative
judgment when the two conflict. The courts consistently failed to demonstrate how extension of First Amendment protection to video telephony
conformed with precedent or furthered the goals of free expression.
Certainly, the Cable Act-telco cases raise difficult issues. The uncertainty inherent in industries and markets undergoing rapid and extensive
transformation exacerbates the difficulty of fact finding that should underlie rational, legal decision-making. Available data are largely speculative,
predictive, and incomplete. Yet the decisions that spring from these data
may aid or handicap the development of unforeseen services.
Thus, courts, regulators, and Congress face a conundrum. Decisions
of potentially enormous impact must be made within an historical frame141. See Entman, supra note 136.
142. See Sandra Braman, Horizons of the State: Information Policy and Power, 45:4 J.
COMM. 4 (1995) (discussing information policy as an exercise of state power); Schauer, The
PoliticalIncidence of the FreeSpeech Principle,supra note 136, at 951.
143. See, e.g., Jim Chen & Daniel J. Gifford, Law as Industrial Policy: Economic
Analysis of Law in a New Key, 25 U. MEM. L. REv. 1315 (1995); Frederick Schauer, The
Occasions of ConstitutionalInterpretation,72 B.U. L. REv. 729, 737 (1992).
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work ill-suited to contemporary conditions and based on partial information supplied by parties with vested interests. Moreover, technological,
economic, and regulatory uncertainty increase the likelihood of error and
the uncertainty ofjurists.
The telephone companies, however, were certain. The telephone
companies knew what could have been gained through successful litigation. They understood the failure of prior efforts to eliminate regulations
based upon claims of changes in the marketplace or in technology. The
telephone companies had the power, the resources, and the ability to
choose to pursue their goals in the courts using the First Amendment
hammer.
Exercise of power in the legal marketplace is not inherently problematic. When power arises from superior knowledge, efficiency, or quality,
its exercise-even in contravention of established public policy-may increase social welfare and benefit the public. However, when power results,
even in part, from government grant, the exercise of that power is unfettered from market demand. Accession to such power may undermine public policy and ill serve the public, particularly when politicization of the
courts undermines the ability of the judiciary to police and protect the interests of the powerless.
It falls outside the purview of this Article to explore whether the outcome of the Cable Act-telco cases serves, or disserves, public policy objectives. Rather, the goal herein is to identify the new-found constitutional
weapon of telephone companies, and to suggest that the First Amendment
presents a real, and a substantial, threat to established, economic-based
regulation of communications firms. The Cable Act-telco cases demonstrate the power and the efficiency of First Amendment arguments to
eliminate constraints imposed by Congress, and offer a timely example of
the creative use of the law to elude regulation in a rent-seeking environment.
Congress too is caught in the web of complex issues and of conflicting goals of powerful players. The Telecommunications Act solved none
of the problems underlying the Cable Act-telco cases; it simply shifted the
battlefield. Policy makers wishing to give the government a stronger defense against constitutional arguments seeking to unravel the Telecommunications Act should seek to justify regulations on both economic and
speech grounds.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The Cable Act-telco cases effectively were over once the telephone
companies transformed themselves into speakers, and the statute's market
constraints into abridgements of free speech.' 44 Indeed, the cases demonstrate the "strange power of speech"' 45 to efficiently open markets to competitive entry when the FCC and Congress fail to deregulate. ' 46 The cases
suggest, as Stanley Fish has noted, that "[i]n our legal culture as it is presently constituted, if one yells 'free speech' in a crowded courtroom and
makes it stick, the case is over."' 4' But how did the telephone companies
make it stick?
That crucial question remains unanswered. The Cable Act-telco cases
suggest that the power of constitutional arguments may be responsive to
prevailing public policy and to gaming by industries frustrated by the glacial pace of administrative and legislative reform. Turner I and II would
not dictate otherwise. For while the Supreme Court has said that the power
of constitutional challenges depends upon the purpose of the challenged
law (as determined by Congress), the Court did not say how to properly
determine congressional purpose.
Clearly then the Cable Act-telco cases could have gone the other
way--as could have TurnerI or II. Indeed, the Cable Act-telco cases demonstrate the absence of any grand, unifying constitutional jurisprudence.
The First Amendment power is both uncertain and situational.

144. See Laurence H. Winer, The Red Lion of Cable, and Beyond?-Turner Broadcasting v. FCC, 15 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 5 (1997) (disagreeing with First Amendment
challenges to economic regulations as "Lochnerizing" and arguing for presumptive application of strict scrutiny because "[w]e should not assume that we can easily or meaningfully
distinguish, for First Amendment purposes, inappropriate content regulation of the media
from what appears to be largely economic or structural regulation.").
145. Samuel Taylor Coleridge, The Rime of the Ancient Mariner, in THE POETICAL
WORKS OF COLERIDGE, SHELLEY, AND KEATS 60-66 (Crissy & Markley 1852) (1798).
146. Robinson, supra note 1, at 1023 n.27 (providing an example of "the extent to which
the First Amendment has become a routine part of the opposition to ordinary economic
regulation." (citing Time Warner Entertainment Co. v. FCC, 93 F.3d 957 (D.C. Cir.

1996))).
147. Stanley Fish, There's No Such Thing as Free Speech and It's a Good Thing, Too,
in DEBATING P.C.: THE CONTROVERSY OVER POLITICAL CORRECTNESS ON COLLEGE
CAMPUSES 231, 235 (Paul Berman ed., 1992).
148. Turner Il,117 S.Ct. 1174 (1997); see also Bhagwat, supra note 7 (asserting that
content neutrality is determined by the purpose of the challenged law).

